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The methods of legal scholarship today are not self-evident. There are various reasons for 
the growing self-consciousness of legal scholars about their methodology. One of these 
is the internationalisation of legal research, which among other things has generated 
a change in the culture of legal publication towards peer-reviewed journals with 
stricter norms for methodological justification. Another reason is the weakening link 
between academic legal scholarship and national legal practice, which raises questions 
about the identity of legal scholarship as something distinct from legal practice and 
the extent to which methods define legal scholarship. A third reason is the popularity 
of interdisciplinary research in law, which gives lawyers reason to compare their own 
methods to those of other disciplines.
 In many respects, the debate on legal method takes its cue from American debates 
about the character of legal research and the directions to be taken. This is visible, for 
instance, in the call for interdisciplinary research and in the still growing popularity of 
law and economics, both of which started in the American academic world.
 However, there are also distinctly European developments, many of which we 
can connect to the Europeanisation of law in the context of the European Union. The 
expansion of the European Union has renewed the interest in the legal cultures of 
European countries, giving rise to comparative law research in the European context. 
In private law, ambitious projects abound proposing, for instance, pan-European legal 
norms of contract law.1 These themes involve exploring the differences and similarities 
in European legal systems and their cultural contexts.
 In this issue of Erasmus Law Review, we take a step back from the study of the legal 
norms to look at European legal scholarship. The methods of legal scholarship are an 
underlying factor influencing the diversity of developments of legal systems. The divide 
between common law and civil law is not only visible in the particularities of the law 
in practice, but also in differing methodological approaches. For some comparative law 
scholars, the different style or mentalité of the common law and civil law approach is 
reason to be sceptical of all attempts to integrate law in Europe.2 The idea of this issue 
is to approach the possibility of a common European legal method with an open mind, 
with no prior commitment to either belief or scepticism.
 To that end, we present general reflections on the history and present character of 
European legal scholarship. The central aim of the issue is the identification of common 
strands in the heritage of European legal scholarship that could serve as starting points 
for a common legal method in Europe. This question is approached from two angles, 
namely by studying the historical development of legal scholarship in Europe and by 
studying the philosophical basis of legal method.
 Looking at legal method from a historical perspective, the acknowledged common 
thread of legal scholarship in Europe is the study of Roman law. In his contribution, 
Tammo Wallinga takes this as his starting point. However, he argues that Roman law 
was not the only common core: canon law was a second important component of legal 
scholarship that served to develop general legal concepts, accompanied by moral theology 
and the idea of natural law. Wallinga shows how legal scholarship in the universities on 
the European continent developed as a series of attempts at systematising law, mainly 
by applying logical and critical methods to the texts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis and 
Corpus Iuris Canonici, but also by criticising Roman law with the help of natural law 
principles.
1 See, for instance, the EU Commission’s Green Paper of 1 July 2010 on policy options for progress 
towards a European Contract Law for consumers and businesses, COM (2010) 348.
2 Pierre Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (1997) 60(1) The Modern Law Review 44 at 45.
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 To this, two observations can be added. First, Wallinga’s article shows the dynamics 
between sources of case law, which is essentially the nature of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
and general concepts of law. The desire to merge the two can be seen as the major 
impetus for a systematic legal method. Solving the difficulty of remaining true to the 
authoritative texts, while at the same time constructing general legal principles, has 
stimulated methodological creativity from the scholastic period until now. Secondly, 
the historical relationship between academia and legal practice merits attention. 
Currently, the close relationship between legal scholarship and legal practice is regarded 
suspiciously. The fact that legal methods in scholarship have largely been the same as 
those in, primarily, judicial practice is one reason why legal scholarship is not regarded 
as equal, academically, to other disciplines. Looking back to the Middle Ages, we can 
see that these methods actually originate in university teaching. The development of 
legal interpretation and argumentation started with the study of Roman texts. These 
academic achievements turned out to have practical relevance, although not all scholarly 
approaches were well received: humanism’s historical and critical approach was an 
unwelcome challenge to textual authority.
 Whereas Wallinga finds his point of departure in the historical practice of legal 
scholarship, Carel Smith in his article explores the philosophical basis of legal method. 
His main claim is that hermeneutics can be regarded as the paradigm, in Kuhn’s sense, 
of legal scholarship. Hermeneutics is not itself a methodology for lawyers, but an 
account of the conditions for the understanding of law. Both legal doctrine and, more 
abstractly, legal theory are premised on the philosophical idea that understanding of law 
requires taking the internal, participant’s point of view. Although the routes towards 
acknowledgement of this idea in legal theory are very different, Smith shows that the 
work of the European philosophers Gadamer and Wittgenstein can serve to explain the 
common underlying theory. The constraints for legal interpretation and research are 
social, bound up with institutions and interpretive communities.
 These historical and philosophical reflections on legal scholarship and method 
yield an optimistic, albeit tentative, conclusion about the possibility of constructing 
a common European legal method. As Smith argues, the paradigm for legal theory is 
shared by Anglo-American and continental European theorists, which provides a basis 
on which to build a European legal method. However, this paradigm also encompasses 
the idea that culture is an important determinant of legal interpretation. If culture 
matters so much in law, the diversity in legal cultures may also influence, and interfere 
with, the development of a common method. Studying methodology in the context of 
legal cultures and the concrete possibilities for common ground would therefore be an 
interesting next step, building on the general work presented here.
